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NOTES
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The Elements of the Doctrine:
Most of the courts and writers on the subject are agreed that the essentials
of the doctrine of assumption of risk embrace knowledge and appreciation of the
danger on the part of the one assuming the risk.' The term "assumption of risk"
implies that one must be aware of the danger involved, and appreciate the exist-
,ence of this danger; and, further that he then acquiesce in its presence. It follows
that the condition of peril must have existed long enough to give the alleged
"assumer" adequate or reasonable time to be charged with knowledge of it.2
Without knowledge of the danger on the part of the on assuming the risk,
it is impossible to invoke the doctrine.8
Pennsylvania follows these requirements. In the case of Verna v. Lopresti4 the
Superior Court said:
"the plaintiff must know and appreciate or should know and appreciate
the danger..."
The Supreme Court, in Valjago v. Carnegie,5 expresses a similar view:
". .. it must appear clearly from the evidence, or there must be a finding
of fact, that the plaintiff with full knowledge of the nature of the risk,
impliedly took the chances of it."
The Application of the Doctrine:
There has been a great deal of confusion in legal circles in Pennsylvania,
and elsewhere, concerning the doctrine of assumption of risk. 6 One reason for
the confusion has been the difficulty in determining in just which type of case
the defense will be allowed. The late Chief Justice Holmes, in Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Railway,7 held that the earliest application of
the phrase pertained only to cases arising out of master-servant relations. A min-
ority still hold this limited application of the rule;8 but it has been extended to
cases involving contractual relationships by others.9
A majority of jurisdictions, applying the doctrine broadly, extend it to include
the maxim, Volenti Non Fit Injuria (that to which a person assents is not deemed
an injury by the law).10 In a law review article by Professor Charles Warren en-
titled, "Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence"," the author statts:
1 PROSSER ON TORTS, page 377 (1941).
2 Supra note 1, pages 385-386; 38 AMERICAN JURIS. 845.
3 HAPER ON TORTS, p. 291, 1933; Green Co. v. Bresmer, 97 Pa. 103 (1881).
4 157 Pa. Super. 163 (1945).
5 226 Pa. 514 (1909).
6 Eliot v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 160 Pa. Super. 291 (1946).
7 205 U. S. 1 (1906).
8 Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 92 F.2d 737 (1937).
9 38 AMERICAN JURIS. 845. Southern Paciwic v. McCready 47 F.2d 673 (1931).
10 Gover v. Central Vermont R. R., 118 A. 874 (Vt. 1922).
11 8 HA&v. L. Rav.. 457 (1895).
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".. . the scope of the defense (assumption of risk) as applied in
actions of negligence has been extended to conduct showing a willingness
to take the chances of the defendants actions, and to run the risk, i.e.
ageneral assent to a condition which may or may not give rise to a cause
of action."
The Restatement of Torts allows this broad application of the rule in § 893.
"A person who knows that another has created a danger or is doing
a dangerous act, or that the land and chattels of another are dangerous,
and whc nevertheless chooses to enter upon or to remain within or per-
mit his things to remain within the area of risk, is not entitled to recover
for harm unintentionally caused to him or his things by the others con-
duct or by the condition of the premises..."
Pennsylvania follows this view and allows the defense to be brought under
the scope of the maxim. In Hall v. Ziegler,12 where the plaintiff attempted to
unlock the bumpers of two automobiles by standing between them, being there-
by injured, the court said:
"... the act of a plaintiff who chooses a place of danger in preference
to one of comparative safety and is thereby injured, amounts to an as-
sumption of the risk."
Assumption of risk has been most frequently used in personal injury cases
where the plaintiff and defendant are in a master-servant relation. So, it would
be interesting to note several factors which influence the applicability of the
doctrine in these master-servant casts.
Servants are subject to the defense of assumption of risk in the usual case
where they are aware of. the danger.14 Also, where the servant informs the master
of the defect and continues work without any comment from the master, the serv-
ant is still held to be assuming the risk.15 Even his employer's negligence, of which
he is aware, will not exclude the defense.16 Special or unforeseen negligence by
the master will, of course, exclude the defense.17 Where the plaintiff tells his
master of the defect and is told that there is no danger, and is subsequently in-
jured, it is held that he has not assumed the risk.' 8 But, if the assurance of
safety is given to a person of mature years, experienced in the kind of work
he is doing, assumption of risk will still defeat recovery by the employee where
the risk is known and comprehended by him. 1'
12 361 Pa. 228 (1949).
12 Bohlen, Volumnary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. REv. 14 (1906).
14 Dutry v. Phil. and Reading R. R., 265 Pa. 215 (1919).
Is Nuss v. Rafsnyder, 178 Pa. 397 (1896).
16 Guerierro v. Reading R. R. Co., 346 Pa. 187 (1942).
17 Rulh v. Philadelphia et al., 346 Pa. 214 (1942).
1: Hughes v. Fayette Co., 214 Pa. 282 (1906).
19 Herron v. American Steel and Wire Co., 230 Pa. 90 (1911).
NOTES
Another reason for the present state of the law on this subject has been
the confusion of the defenses of "assumption of risk" and "contributory neglig-
ence." In Eliot v. Philadelphia Transfer Company"° the court said:
"According to text writers the term voluntary assumption of risk is
confusing as it is used in a dual sense. First, as synonymous with the term
contributory negligence, which implies negligence upon both plaintiffand defendant, and second, where there is no question of defendants
negligence but where the risk is voluntarily assumed in the course of a
master-servant relationship, or some other voluntary undertaking, such
as landowner and licensee, guest and passenger, etc."21
It is easy to understand how the two defenses may be confused. Still, though
they are similar in nature and effect, there are definite distinctions which should
be noted.22 These differences have been defined in the following manner by the
Maryland court:
"Contributory negligence defeats recovery because it is a proximate cause
of the accident which happens, but assumption of risk defeats recovery
because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an ac-
cident occurs." 23
The state of the law in Pennsylvania seems to be that while there is a distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence as defenses, the result
is the same; namely, the plaintiff cannot recover. In Tharp v. Penna. Railroad
24
this defense (assumption of risk) was referred to as contributory negligence.
"A person having a choice of two ways, one of which is safe, while the
other is subject to risks and changes, and who voluntarily chooses the
dangerous way and is injured, such person is guilty of contributory' neglig-
ence and cannot recover."2 5
Recent Case:
A recent case of interest on this subject is Rubin Bros. v. Standard Equipment
Co.,2 6 dedded this year. In this case the plaintiff, who operated a junk and rag
storage depot, wanted some welding done. A welder was sent by the defendant
company and the work performed. During the welding a fire broke out in rags
stored nearby and a building was consumed. It was proved that employees of the
plaintiff had provided metal shields to guard against sparks from the welding
opration. The court instructed the jury they might find an assumption of risk
under these circumstances. The verdict was for the defendant and a motion for
a new trial was overruled. According to the briefs submitted, neither side found
20 See note 6, supra.
21 For a further reference, see note 13, supra.
22 Supra, note 1, p. 378.
23 Gordon v. Maryland State Fair, 199 A. 319 (Md. 1938).
24 332 Pa. 233 (1938).
25 Also see Patterson v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 389 (1874), where the
court treats assumption of risk and contributory negligence as convertible terms.
20 60 Dau. Co. 401 (195o).
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a case in Pennsylvania on point. As before stated, Pennsylvania follows the
broad application of the doctrine, but the great majority of factual situations in-
volve suits brought by a servant against his master, so this case may well point
the way for actions with similar factual backgrounds in this jurisdiction.
This has been an attempt to point out the elements of the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk, the various views as to its applicability, its confusion with
the defense of contributory negligence, the Pennsylvania view on the subject. It
is hoped this will aid in realizing the problems involved in an otherwise elementary
rule of law.
William W. Caldwell
